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Introduction
The next step for the paradigm of embodied music cognition (EMC) is to move from building theo-
ries of (empirical) data toward building systematic explanations of organisms’ capacities to process
music. I argue that for the mirror neuron (MN) hypothesis to be effective when applied to music,
these neurons’ capacities should be proven to be nontrivially and causally connected with musical
organisms as a whole. This requires, I argue, a mechanistic type of explanation.
Mirror Neurons and Music
The reception of the MN hypothesis within EMC has been warm at least since the start of sys-
tematic research in this paradigm (Leman, 2008). Researchers working on mirror neurons (e.g.,
Jeannerod, 2001) speculated that since these neurons are activated during the observation and
the execution of a monkey’s motor actions, they enable the animal to understand others’ behav-
ior by simulating their actions in its own brain. Although the non-human primates themselves
are not musical (McDermott and Hauser, 2007), the MN hypothesis was quickly adopted in musi-
cal research (Molnar-Szakacs and Overy, 2006). Even if the exact counterparts of mirror neurons
have not been yet found in the human brain, the EMC research community (Matyja and Schiavio,
2013) has approached the very idea of them internally simulating the musical behaviors of others
with huge enthusiasm. For instance, the analogs of the MN system in humans are now hypothe-
sized to be connected with (or at least in some way an explanatory factor in) understanding facial
expressions and nonverbal communication in musical ensembles (Vines et al., 2006), embodied
simulation of music (Schiavio et al., 2015), distinguishing self from others (Novembre et al., 2012),
and enabling the understanding of intentions embedded inmusic (Corness, 2008). All of the above-
mentioned tasks require MNs to internally simulate (musical) actions or the intentions of others or
the content conveyed by a given musical signal.
Embodied Simulation and Music
Overy and Molnar-Szakacs (2009), being perhaps the most influential researchers working on MN
and music declare that MN may serve as a basis for providing models of phenomena that are of
direct interest to the EMC community. Yet we still do not have any idea of how they may do
it. Current references to the operation of human analogs of the MN system’s activations rely on
the black box type of explanations, in which they are supposed to play an important but vaguely
specified role in producing the behavioral output given the perceptual input. Consider the fol-
lowing example: Cochrane (2010, p. 20) provides what he has dubbed the “simulation theory of
musical expressivity,” in which “music is seen as hijacking the simulation mechanism of the brain.”
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Cochrane’s argument is based on three main steps. The causal
process introduced there goes as follows. First, there is a (a)
the triggering of a brain’s emotion-detecting simulation mech-
anism, which is done either by belief or imagination of the
agency generating the sound. Secondly, (b) the intermodal con-
nection between sound and bodily movements is utilized, which
then leads to (c) the mirroring of these movements from a
first-person perspective, which elicits a simulation of emo-
tions in the listener (Schiavio et al., 2015). However, the cru-
cial problem here is that we have no idea how MNs do it.
Cochrane’s theory leaves the answer to this particular ques-
tion hanging upon the further theoretical clarifications and/or
empirical confirmations of whether MNs themselves are suf-
ficient for systematically explaining the process of simulation.
For these two reasons, we now need to advance to the next
step.
Next Step: “How” Mirror Neurons Do It?
Our current state of knowledge about activations of the MN
system counterparts in humans relies upon the heuristics of local-
ization (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993) common to neuroscien-
tific data collection methods. By localization here, I simply refer
to the identification of the component parts (e.g., activation of
motor cortices) assumed to be causally involved in the execution
of given tasks. This scientific strategy is may fail to be explana-
tory (Weisberg et al., 2008; Carp, 2012), and does not answer
the question how the phenomena in question occur. Follow-
ing that thought, from a mechanistic explanation’s perspective
the individual parts of an organism (e.g., motor cortices of the
brain) do not themselves realize the working of a given mech-
anism that produces the phenomenon to be explained. There is
a long way from observing the activation of the human coun-
terparts of MNs system to explaining the phenomenon of musi-
cal simulation. Systematic explanation of the human capacity
for musical simulation requires a lot more than the sheer local-
ization of the neural components within the boundaries of the
skull. Because of the commitments of embodied approaches to
music cognition (Matyja and Schiavio, 2013), we should account
for how the whole body shapes the ways in which we simulate
music. While the research on the neural correlates is important,
the systematic explanation of the human capacity for musical
simulation requires decomposition. I assume that the embod-
ied cognitive system responsible for the phenomenon of musi-
cal simulation is hierarchical and decomposable. In order to
see how musical simulation results from different parts and
their activities—following the mechanistic explanation strategy
(Bechtel and Richardson, 1993) we must actually decompose the
phenomenon into the component operations that produced it
and localize them within the parts of the embodied cognitive
mechanism.
Mechanistic Explanation
Mechanistic explanations typically proceed in three steps. We
begin by identifying the phenomenon to be explained, the
explanandum phenomenon. Secondly, we focus on the phe-
nomenon’s decomposition into a number of entities and activities
that are relevant to the explanation. Finally, mechanistic expla-
nations account for these entities and activities, driven by the
question of how they are organized in order to be able to pro-
duce the given phenomenon (Illari and Williamson, 2012). For
the mechanism to be adequately described, we need to account
for the relations within and between the bottom (neural), the
isolated (embodied), and the contexual (situated) levels (Bech-
tel, 2009) on which we analyze music simulation. To illustrate
this, take an biological example of the reproduction of yeasts. The
process of reproduction via budding takes place in a given envi-
ronment (contextual level). It is explained in terms of division
(occurring on the isolated level that ignores the environment)
as well as division in terms of cellular mechanisms (which is
in this example the bottom level, possibly explained further, if
needed, by its molecular parts). Now consider how (cognitive)
scientists build models. They usually start with a hypothesis of
how something works. In our case, the members of the EMC
research community typically assume that MNs are responsible
for various simulations. On the basis of this initial hypothesis,
they build amodel. From amechanistic explanation’s perspective,
which is an account of the components and operations that are
necessary to produce an occurrence of the studied phenomenon.
Take, for instance, the successful mechanistic explanation of
visual processing (as reported by Bechtel, 2009). While the non-
mechanistic accounts often decompose (and, inherently reduce)
visual processing into “parts” operating in sequences, Bechtel
reminds us of the importance of taking the next step: recom-
posing the investigated mechanism. This move is performed tak-
ing into account the organization among these parts, as well as
situating the mechanism in its environments.
Mechanism Sketch for Mirror Neurons: a
Primer
In my opinion, the goal of achieving a systematic explanation of
how MNs work requires understanding of how a whole organ-
ism involved in musical interaction. Accordingly, the cases like
musical simulation (in Cochrane’s sense) ought to be accounted
for in terms of three interrelated levels of explanation derived
through analysis: bottom, isolated, and contextual. The first—
bottom (neural) level encompasses the single neuron and neural
patterns activations. The second—isolated (embodied) level—
is at least partially concerned with drawing broader and often
wild conclusions from the available empirical data. The pri-
mary explanatory heuristic used in these analyses is “Infer-
ence to the Best Explanation” (Okasha, 2000). The idea of
this heuristic is that a given hypothesis should be inferrable
from the available evidence. However, the fact that MN sys-
tem research is currently under critique (Kilner et al., 2003;
Hickok, 2014) suggests that one should be, at least, cautious in
interpreting the role of their activations (Shapiro, 2011, p. 111;
for a mechanistic explanation of the workings of the MN sys-
tem, see: Herschbach, 2012). From the mechanistic perspective,
the idea behind the isolated level is to examine how a given
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mechanism works as itself, isolated from its environment and
without implicating lower-level structures and functions. It is
thus consistent with laboratory studies that include stimulation
and recording spike trains from an isolated neuron or study-
ing a human subject’s responses to computer-generated stimuli,
which are both examples of this strategy (Wright and Bech-
tel, 2007). Finally, the contextual level. As argued by numer-
ous researchers working in the EMC paradigm, our musical
interactions are not only subject to bodily-environmental inter-
actions, but are also situated within historical and cultural con-
straints (Clarke, 2005; Leman, 2008). These intuitions are (at
least) consistent with mechanistic explanations. For instance
Bechtel (2009) underlines the high risk of underestimating the
significance of environmental structures, therefore pointing to
the critical importance of experimentation in organisms’ natural
environments.
Conclusions
In my opinion, the efficacy of the MN hypothesis as applied
to music cognition relies crucially on providing a mechanistic
explanation of how these neurons interact with the components
of an organism involved in musical interactions. While we cur-
rently assume that the role of MNs in music cognition is to sim-
ulate, EMC researchers should start accounting for how these
neurons do it exactly. This next step, which essentially requires a
shift from relying on the neuroscientific heuristic of localization
(i.e., of the human activations counterpart of MN) to the heuris-
tics of decomposition (i.e., understanding how they interact with
embodied organisms as whole) and further recomposition of the
identifiedmechanism via situating it in its (both bodily andmusi-
cal) environment. The next step for the EMC research paradigm
is thus to consider the value of mechanistic explanations.
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